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ARTICLE 
FEE-SHIFTING TO PROMOTE THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
MARYLAND 
By: The Maryland Access to Justice Commission' 
1. CHANGING INCENTIVES TO CREATE MEANINGFUL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
IN MARYLAND 
M arkets are shaped by incentives. Incentives, in tum, are shaped by the laws and regulations that govern the market. When it comes to 
access to justice, a market that matters is the market for legal 
representation in civil rights and other types of cases with low or non-
monetary relief potential. Under ordinary market conditions, few 
attorneys have an incentive to offer representation to these claimants, 
despite the relatively large number of potential claims. Statutes that 
authorize an award of attorney's fees in such cases can shift market 
forces, creating incentives for attorneys to take clients and pursue 
meritorious claims that do not normally make sense from a business 
perspective. Fee-shifting, in other words, connects the individuals who 
may have been harmed with counsel who can aid them in seeking to 
enforce their rights under the law. The action of these private individuals 
provides a significant public benefit by enforcing the law, deterring future 
misconduct and promoting compliance with the law. Fee-shifting also 
reduces the need for government resources for enforcement of critical 
remedial laws. 
In its Interim Report, the Maryland Access to Justice Commission 
recognized the role fee-shifting schemes play in expanding access to legal 
representation. 1 The Commission noted the large number of independent 
fee-shifting statutes in the State, each of which is associated with a 
particular type of claim, creating a non-uniform panoply of individual, 
statutorily created fee provisions? The Commission also highlighted the 
notable lack of a provision for fees in cases involving State constitutional 
claims, stating that "[f]ederal claimants have the benefit of 42 USC § 
1988. There is no state equivalent in Maryland, forcing many litigants to 
focus on federal law claims and sue in federal court when they could 
instead litigate in their own communities under Maryland law if they 
• This document is the work of the Maryland Access to Justice Commission only. It 
does not represent the policy of the Maryland Judiciary. 
1 MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N, INTERIM REpORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2009), 
available at http://www.courts.state.md.uslmdatjc/pdfslinterirnreportIll009.pdf. 
2 Id. 
38 
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could attract counsel.,,3 To strengthen and render more uniform the 
award of attorney's fees in Maryland, the Commission "endorse[d] the 
principle of a general fee-shifting provision as a means to promote access 
to justice through an award of attorney's fees for individuals successfully 
enforcing their rights under Maryland law or the Maryland 
Constitution.,,4 
In acting on this recommendation, Maryland will have an opportunity 
to shape the market for legal services to create economic incentives that 
protect important rights. This will, of necessity, require a nuanced 
approach that balances the need for increased access to counsel, and 
subsequently an increase in the use of litigation to enforce those rights in 
a way that does not unduly burden state and local governments and large 
institutional defendants who are most often the targets of this type of 
litigation. 5 The challenge is to modify the current incentive structure to 
promote only meritorious actions like those anticipated by the framers of 
the Maryland Constitution and rights-creating statutes. While it may be 
difficult to achieve that balance, it is worth pursuing, for without it, many 
of the rights established in the State remain unenforceable. 
This white paper is intended to address the many issues likely to be 
raised in a conversation about whether to adopt a general fee-shifting 
provision for State statutory and constitutional claims. Section II will 
examine the history of fee-shifting in the context of the American and 
English Rules. Section III will explore the various rationales for fee-
shifting and its effect on market incentives. In Section IV, the paper will 
discuss several variants on the theme of how a fee-shifting scheme could 
or should be structured. Section V will discuss how fee awards are 
calculated and issues Maryland should consider in crafting its scheme. 
Section VI considers the implications of fee-shifting for sovereign 
immunity and the possible impact on the Maryland Tort Claims Act. 
Section VII will discuss the many fee-shifting provisions embedded in 
individual Maryland laws to address how those might be rendered more 
3 Id. at 26; see also Stephen J. Shapiro, Suits Against State Officials for Damages for 
Violations of Constitutional Rights: Comparing Maryland and Federal Law, 23 U. BALT. L. 
REv. 423, 435-36 (1994) ("Although there is no statutory remedy in Maryland similar to 
Section 1983 for violations of rights provided by the Maryland Constitution, the [C]ourt of 
[A]ppeals has held that a common-law action for damages is available for such violations. In 
setting forth the guidelines for common-law actions against state officials, the [C]ourt of 
[A]ppeals has established different standards of liability than those in a Section 1983 action.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
4 MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note I, at 26. 
5 Id. at 25; see also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: 
The Supreme Court, Congress and Statutory Fees, 69 TEx .. L. REv. 291, 298-99 (1990) 
(explaining the effects of public interest litigation on society). 
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unifonn by a generic statute. Finally, in Section VIII, the paper will 
propose language for a general fee-shifting statute in Maryland. 
II. FEE-SHIFTING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAN RULE 
Under the prevailing "American Rule," which Maryland follows, each 
party to a lawsuit generally must pay his or her own legal fees, regardless 
of the outcome, with only a few exceptions.6 This presumption was 
adopted early in the American colonies, as a rejection of the "English 
Rule" under which the losing party in British courts is required to pay the 
litigation costs of both parties.7 Today, the United States is in a minority 
of industrialized nations adhering to the American Rule. England and 
Europe generally follow the English Rule, also referred to as "general 
indemnity."g The English Rule discourages non-meritorious claims and 
only plaintiffs who expect to prevail are likely to take the significant risk 
of initiating litigation.9 The American Rule was intended to increase 
access to the courts so that "impecunious plaintiffs could bring 
meritorious lawsuits without fear that they would be responsible for 
paying opposing counsel's fees if unsuccessful." I 0 
Despite the reduced risk under the American Rule, the rule also 
creates significant barriers for some potential claimants. For example, 
low-income individuals with legal needs may lack the resources to 
engage an attorney. The American Rule colors the type of claims that are 
brought by preserving the economic incentive for meritorious cases with 
high damage claims, but eliminating the incentive for cases with low or 
non-monetary claims. I I Even plaintiffs who do go forward must be 
willing to be made "less than whole," because they must deduct their 
litigation costs from the compensation awarded. Further, "[i]f a 
prevailing party can recover her physician bills, it is not clear why she 
cannot recover her attorney fees, since both represent out-of-pocket 
expenses.,,12 Finally, the American Rule discourages claims for non-
monetary relief, as prayers for injunctive or declaratory relief could never 
survive a simple cost-benefit analysis. A plaintiff with means may elect 
6 Thomas v. Gladstone, 386 Md. 693, 699, 874 A.2d 434, 437 (2005) ("[T]he prevailing 
party in a lawsuit may not recover attorney's fees unless (1) the parties to a contract have an 
agreement to that effect, (2) there is a statute that allows the imposition of such fees, (3) the 
wrongful conduct of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party, or (4) a 
plaintiff is forced to defend against a malicious prosecution."). 
7 Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982). 
8 Id. at 651, 654. 
9 Id. at 652-53. 
10 Brand, supra note 5, at 297. 
11 Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee-Shifting, 79 VA. L. REv. 2039, 2048 (1993). 
12 Id. at 2069. 
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to spend the money on counsel to pursue such claims. Those of limited 
means have neither the option to do so with their own resources, nor the 
ability to secure counsel on the promise of payment from the returns. \3 
It is precisely the poor and politically powerless who are likely to have 
more difficulty retaining counsel in such a market. Low-income 
individuals are likely to have lower damage claims, especially when 
based on lost income. Further, claims to vindicate important rights under 
the state constitution may nonetheless result in only nominal damages 
awards. 14 
Exceptions to the American Rule 
The American Rule, while still the prevailing assumption under which 
the civil courts operate in the United States, is hardly inviolate. 
Exceptions to the American Rule were introduced early on to counter 
some of the rule's limitations. 
Contingency fees were an initial departure from the rule that did not 
change its underlying premise. IS The adoption of contingency fees, once 
thought usurious, permitted the plaintiff to utilize damage recoveries to 
encourage and finance the litigation. 16 Such an innovation was seen as a 
means to secure representation and redress for the poor. 17 One reason 
suggested for the rise of contingency fees was the scarcity of circulating 
cash in the American colonies. 18 Settlers deprived of land had no way to 
pay for an attorney up front. 19 The use of contingency fees increased 
during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.20 Notably opposed to 
contingency fee arrangements at the tum of the 20th Century were railroad 
attorneys, physicians facing malpractice claims, and jurists. 21 
Fee-shifting schemes have become another significant departure from 
the American Rule and have their origins in both judge-made and 
statutory innovation.22 By the late 1930's, American courts, especially 
the federal courts, had begun to craft these types of exceptions to the 
13 Daniel L. Lowery, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-Shifting 's 
Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1441,1443 (1993). 
14 Brand, supra note 5, at 299. 
15 Id.; see also Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The 
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940,47 DEPAUL L. REv. 231, 232-
60 (1998) (providing a history of contingency fees). 
16 Brand, supra note 5, at 299. 
17 See generally Karsten, supra note 15. 
18 Karsten, supra note 15, at 234. 
19 Id. at 234-35 (quoting State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. 375,401 (1830». 
20 Karsten, supra note 15, at 248. 
21 Id. at 254. 
22 See THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES: REPORT OF THE 
TfURD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, 108 F.R.D. 237,241 (1985). 
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American Rule.23 There were two primary doctrines courts drew upon in 
justifying the award of attorney's fees in contravention of the American 
Rule. The "common fund," or "fund-in-court," doctrine permits a 
plaintiff whose actions result in the creation of a fund in which others 
have a common interest, to be reimbursed from that fund for the costs 
they incurred in bringing the lawsuit.24 The doctrine is designed to avoid 
the unjust enrichment of those who benefit from the fund created by the 
litigation, but would otherwise bear none of the litigation costS.25 Courts 
also began to use their authority to fashion equitable relief to extend the 
common-fund doctrine to cases in which the returns were small, but the 
benefits widespread.26 
The second doctrine was the "private attorney general" doctrine, 
which justifies the extension of fee awards to individuals who initiate 
actions that secure non-monetary benefits or rights for persons not parties 
to the litigation.27 Further, the private attorney general concept was 
crafted to acknowledge the role individuals play in supplementing 
government enforcement of the law.28 Government may not be able to 
enforce all provisions of the laws that make up the complex remedial 
scheme created to protect individual rights. Many of those laws create a 
private right of action, precisely to encourage private individuals to take 
steps to enforce the law.29 Those private actions put violators on notice 
that the law will be enforced, thereby deterring future non-compliance.3o 
Under the private attorney general doctrine, this larger social benefit 
justifies the award of attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff. 
The private attorney general doctrine was foreclosed to federal courts 
by Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness Society.31 Plaintiffs had sued the 
Secretary of the Interior seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prevent the issuance of construction permits for the Alaska oil pipeline.32 
The Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit awarded fees under 
the private attorney general doctrine in the absence of a statutory fee-
shifting provision.33 The Supreme Court reversed, positing that the 
creation of a fee-shifting scheme was the prerogative of Congress and 
23 ld. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.; see also Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (providing an early example 
of the common fund doctrine). 
26 See THIRD CIRCUIT, supra note 22, at 24l. 
27 Id. 
28 Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 285 (1975) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
29 See id. at 263 (majority opinion). 
30 See id. at 263-64. 
31 Id. at 241-42. 
32 Id. at 241. 
33 !d. 
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could not be judicially created under the private attorney general 
doctrine.34 Alyeska closed one door but opened another, ushering in an 
era of statutorily created fee-shifting schemes. The most significant of 
these statutes was the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 
("Fees Act"), which Congress passed in direct response to Alyeska?5 The 
Fees Act authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party in civil rights litigation.36 Other fee statutes were passed 
during this period, including the Equal Access to Justice Act, 37 the 
Freedom of Information Act,38 and the Truth in Lending Act. 39 By 1990 
there were over 100 federal fee-shifting statutes.40 
Contractions of the Private Attorney General System 
Both judge-made and statutory expressions of the private attorney 
general doctrine have experienced some retrenchment over the last thirty 
years. A number of restrictions were imposed on organizations funded by 
the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) significantly affecting the 
ability of these providers to take advantage of fee-shifting rules to benefit 
the pOOr.41 The LSC Act of 1974, and additional provisions passed in 
1996, prohibited funded organizations from, among other things, 
handling fee-generating cases, or receiving an award of attorney's fees. 42 
More onerously, the 1996 restrictions extended the prior restrictions to 
activities funded by non-LSC funds. 43 
The Administration of George H.W. Bush (Bush I Administration) 
adopted a policy that disfavored fee-shifting under the aegis of the 
President's Council on Competitiveness and its Agenda for Civil Justice 
34 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 265. 
35 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,9-10 (1980) (holding that 
the Fees Act pennits prevailing plaintiffs in a 1983 action to recover fees whether the claim is 
brought in state or federal court); see a/so THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 22, at 241. 
36 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 9-10. 
37 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (West 2007); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(a)-(b) (West 2011); 42 U.S.c. § 
1988 (West 2000) (providing fees to prevailing parties in non-tort civil litigation against the 
federal government). 
38 5 U.S.c.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (West 2009). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (West 2010). 
40 See Brand, supra note 5, at 301. Another notable and long-standing exception to the 
American Rule has been the Alaskan experiment where for over one hundred years, court 
rules have provided for two-way fee-shifting, similar to the English Rule. Alaska provides 
fees on a specific schedule to the prevailing party. AK. R. CIV. P. 82; see also Walter Olson & 
David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (1996) (advocating 
the use ofa two-way fee-shifting scheme similar to Alaska's in the interests of "syrnrnetry"). 
41 See Camille D. Holmes, Linda E. Perle & Alan W. Houseman, Race-Based Advocacy: 
The Role and Responsibility ofLSC-Funded Programs, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 61 (2002). 
42 See id. 
43 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, § 50 (1996); see also Holmes, supra note 41, at 62. 
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Reform in America.44 At the Council's recommendation, President Bush 
signed an Executive Order, since revoked, discouraging federal agencies 
from seeking enactment of any more one-way fee-shifting statutes.45 Fee-
shifting schemes are admittedly designed to encourage litigation by small, 
individual complainants aggrieved by larger, institutional actors like 
governments, employers and corporations.46 The Council, which was 
established to create a favorable climate for business and corporate 
interests, correctly perceived that fee-shifting statutes were designed to 
level the playing field for individuals who would otherwise have little 
opportunity to insist on enforcement of existing laws that check corporate 
and government behavior.47 When the playing field is leveled, it seems 
even a lion can fear a mouse. 
The federal bench has also played a role in narrowing the effectiveness 
of private attorneys general. The Supreme Court rejected the "catalyst 
theory" under which a plaintiff could be awarded fees when the lawsuit 
caused the defendant to change its behavior, whether or not the case went 
to tria1.48 Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources altered the definition of 
"prevailing party" to exclude those who do not secure a judicially 
imposed result in their favor. 49 
These and other retrenchments reflect a denigration of public interest 
practice and undercut the important public policy considerations that led 
Congress to pass the Fees Act and other statutory fee-shifting provisions. 
Specifically, Congress stated that "[t]he premise of the Fees Act is that 
there is a dearth of public interest lawyers and that competitive market 
rates are necessary to attract competent counsel. ,,50 
III. RATIONALES FOR FEE-SHIFTING AND ITS EFFECT ON MARKET 
INCENTIVES 
There are a range of rationales that have been used to justify fee-
shifting. Some are based on equitable principles, others are incentive-
based.51 An examination of these rationales and counterarguments helps 
to illustrate the range of implications to be considered in trying to craft a 
44 Krent, supra note 11, at 2039. 
45 Exec. Order No. 12778, 3 C.F.R. 359, 365 (1991), invalidated by, Exec. Order No. 
12988, reprinted in, 28 U.S.c. § 519 (West 2006). 
46 Rowe, supra note 7, at 663-64. 
47 Krent, supra note 11, at 2042. 
48 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598,605 (2001). 
49 Jd. at 606. 
50 Brand, supra note 5, at 377. 
51 Rowe, supra note 7, at 652. 
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market for legal representation that promotes access to justice without 
inappropriately burdening either the courts or institutional defendants. 
Fee-Shifting Promotes Fairness 
The primary argument for a rule of general indemnity is that of 
fairness, namely, "that the prevailing party, having been adjudged to be in 
the right, should not suffer financially for having to prove the justice of 
his position.,,52 This argument is compelling, although it can be easily 
used to justify a two-way fee-shifting scheme. Congress, when it has 
imposed a statutory scheme, has generally favored one-way fee-shifting, 
for reasons that will be analyzed in Section IV. 
Fee-Shifting Permits the Aggrieved to be "Made Whole" 
An individual who has been harmed can point to two sources of 
injury-the damages she suffered in enduring the initial harm and the 
amount she expended to redress the wrong by bringing the suit. If the 
latter must be deducted from the former, she will feel acutely that she has 
not been "made whole." There are some limitations to this rationale as 
well. "Make whole" compensation, considered alone, can lead to a 
particularly harsh result if it was an extremely close call whether the loser. 
did anything wrong, such as when a novel question of law is involved. 53 
It is only really justifiable if the loser is somehow at fault. 54 Where two 
parties have a legitimate, good faith, disagreement over the interpretation 
of law, fee-shifting may be less justified by the "make whole" rationale 
alone, as neither party created or exacerbated the litigation expense.55 
This is, in part, why such awards remain discretionary, even though they 
are intended to be virtually automatic. 
Fee-Shifting Deters and Punishes Undesirable Behavior 
Fee awards have been used by courts to punish willful disobedience of 
a court order, as part of a fine, or when the losing party has acted in bad 
faith.56 More generally, statutory fee awards permit the significance of 
the defeat to have a larger effect on the loser, especially where the 
damage award itself is low or non-pecuniary. 57 When a statute includes a 
one-way fee-shifting provision, private actors must consider the potential 
plaintiffs litigation expenses when weighing the full costs of non-
52 Id. at 654. 
53 ld. at 655-56. 
54 ld. at 658. 
55 Id. at 658-59. 
56 Alyeska, 421 U.S at 258-59 (citing Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 
399,426-28 (1923)); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 
(1967); F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. for Use ofIndus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,129 (1974). 
57 Krent, supra note II, at 2050, 2053. 
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compliance.58 In this way, the prospect of attorney's fees acts as a check 
on undesirable behavior. 59 Even for governmental agencies who do not 
normally internalize all the costs of litigation, the prospect of attorney's 
fees makes litigation more expensive, deters dilatory tactics and 
discourages deep pocket defendants from over-litigating small cases to 
intimidate opposing parties.60 
Fee-Shifting Promotes Compliance with the Law 
The compliance benefits of fee-shifting are derived from the private 
attorney general doctrine.61 Private action minimizes the legislature's 
cost of monitoring executive branch and private behavior.62 
Whistleblower lawsuits and private enforcement shed light on contested 
administrative practices and decisions.63 
Too Much Litigation? 
The private enforcement rationale is vulnerable to the corollary 
presumption that fee-shifting encourages litigation. To the extent 
litigation is seen as a tool for strengthening the law, this is not necessarily 
a problem. Fee-shifting encourages litigation as a proxy for agency 
investigation and prosecution.64 It removes what some would consider an 
undesirable "market constraint on litigation.,,65 Statutes and constitutions 
that create rights were intended to generate litigation to ensure their 
efficacy.66 To concerns about limiting access as a means of controlling 
crowded court dockets, Senator Mathias, quoting Justice Brennan, had 
this to say: 
It is true of course that there has been an increasing amount of 
litigation of all types filling the calendars of virtually every state 
and federal court. But a solution that shuts the courthouse door in 
the face of a litigant with a legitimate claim for relief, particularly 
a claim for a deprivation of a constitutional right, seems to be not 
only the wrong tool but a dangerous tool for solving the 
problem.67 
58 Id. at 2056, 2058. 
59 See Rowe, supra note 7, at 660-61; see also Krent, supra note 11, at 2063, 2065-69. 
60 Krent, supra note 11, at 2052. 
61 Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183, 
186 (2003). 
62 Krent, supra note 11, at 2044. 
63 Id. at 2046-47. 
64 !d. at 2056. 
65 Id. at 2052. 
66 Id. ("The incentive to litigate small claims aggressively may prove beneficial to the 
system as a whole."). 
67 Brand, supra note 5, at 364-65. 
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One incentive-based analysis suggests "one-way" or "Pro-plaintiff' 
fee-shifting generates the least litigation.68 One-way fee-shifting 
encourages both lawsuits, by enhancing access to the courts, and 
simultaneously encourages settlement, "because low non-compliance 
rates result in low predicted probabilities of success, which in tum reduce 
the settlement gap between plaintiffs and defendants. ,,69 This describes 
the ideal incentive scenario and suggests one-way fee-shifting creates the 
most robust market for legal services. 
The ideal scenario is one in which the legislature passes laws to 
express its values and priori~ies. While the legislature may not have the 
means to police enforcement, private citizens are able to secure counsel, 
and counsel are willing to take those cases precisely because they know 
that, even if their client has limited means, their fee will be covered by a 
fee award. Attorneys still bear the risk of losing their fee should they not 
prevail at trial and, thus, have an incentive to only accept meritorious 
cases. Potential defendants know that should they fail to comply with the 
law, the aggrieved will have few barriers in seeking redress. Thus, 
rational defendants have a strong incentive to comply with the law in the 
first place. It follows that few cases will be brought, and when they are 
brought, they will be worth litigating. 
Fee-Shifting Addresses the Free Rider Problem 
Few plaintiffs will undertake the considerable risk and expense of 
litigation unless it is likely to benefit them individually in some way. In 
other words, before I taking on such a project, a plaintiff will perfonn a 
cost-benefit analysis. The problem with public interest activities is that 
the benefits to any single individual are relatively small and, in many 
cases, are non-pecuniary. The benefits may be small enough that no one 
individual could ever justify the risk and expense. However, these 
activities have a larger social benefit that, when valued in the aggregate, 
certainly justify the litigation costs. 70 
It is appropriate for government to use its authority to create incentives 
for private individuals to take actions that have a larger social benefit. 71 
Governments act to shape markets all the time in a variety of contexts. 
For example, governments recognize the benefits of public interest 
activities undertaken by organizations and support those efforts by 
68 Keith Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 V AND. L. REv. 
1069, 1097 (1993). 
69 ld. 
70 Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public 
Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 234-35 (1984) ("[I]nherent in the 
concept of public interest activity is the notion of action benefitting a larger group than the 
individual or group responsible for the activity."). 
71 Jd. at 235-36. 
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providing such organizations with tax-exempt status, and in some cases, 
by providing grant funding. 72 Fee-shifting statutes are merely an 
extension of this idea-a tool government can use to shift market 
incentives to encourage individuals, including primarily private attorneys, 
to engage in certain types of activities that would otherwise be performed 
by a public entity. 
IV. STRUCTURING THE FEE-SHIFTING SCHEME 
There are a variety of ways to structure a fee-shifting scheme, each of 
which will have a different effect on market incentives. An argument 
may be made for two-way fee-shifting in the interests of equity and 
symmetry, although such a system may create perverse incentives. One-
way fee-shifting in favor of a prevailing plaintiff, on the other hand, is 
narrowly targeted to fulfill the goals expressed by the private attorney 
general doctrine. 73 It will also be important to carefully define 
"prevailing party" to achieve the desired result. 
A two-way fee-shifting system is one of general indemnity.74 This is 
essentially the English Rule under which the losing party, whether 
plaintiff or defendant, is responsible for the prevailing party's attorney's 
fees. 75 Arguments have been made for general indemnity in the interests 
of symmetry76 and fairness. 77 Advocates note that the English Rule 
provides a number of advantages. It discourages speCUlative or non-
meritorious litigation78 and the purposeful delay by defendants aware of 
probable liability.79 Additionally, it addresses the question of fairness for 
defendants involuntarily subjected to litigation and forced to incur 
litigation expenses when, perhaps, they are without fault. 80 A "loser 
pays" system "limits the tactical leverage parties with weak cases can 
obtain by threatening to inflict the cost of litigation on their opponents.,,81 
However, two-way fee-shifting can create conflicts of interest for 
plaintiffs counsel. One study of British cases where general indemnity 
was available examined the impact of "who pays" on lawsuit outcomes. 82 
72 Id. at 237. 
73 Hylton, supra note 68, at 1104. 
74 Olson & Bernstein, supra note 40, at 1166-67. 
75 Id.at1l6In.1. 
76 See id. 
77 See Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income 
Litigants, lOl HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1236-37 (1988). 
78 Olson & Bernstein, supra note 40, at 1161. 
79 ld. at 1163. 
80 Id. at 1162. 
81 Id. at 1161. 
82 See Herbert M. Kritzer, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil 
Justice on the American Economy and Policy: Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in 
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When litigation was privately funded, i.e., the plaintiff bears the cost of 
the representation, there was a substantial incentive for solicitors to settle 
the case, to ensure the defendant would pay their fee. 83 This pennitted 
the solicitor to avoid having to collect from the plaintiff who mayor may 
not have adequate means. 84 During the 1980's in England, solicitors with 
income-eligible clients were paid directly for their services by legal aid 
and received a reduced, but guaranteed, payment. 85 When a legal aid 
litigant lost, the prevailing party was not entitled to collect fees from 
either the losing party or the legal aid fund. 86 Thus, "if a settlement is not 
arrived at easily, the solicitor has little to lose by pursuing it as far as 
necessary.,,87 One result was that fewer legal aid cases in England 
settled, and barristers found their trial calendar included a 
disproportionate number of legal aid cases.88 Finally, during this period, 
a large number of individuals had legal services available to them through 
trade unions, where the solicitor was paid in full for her services by the 
union.89 Statistics reflected that the union solicitor was the most 
successful advocate.9o Full payment by the union removed the 
disincentives for advocacy associated with two-way fee-shifting. 91 
Other studies of litigation under the English Rule suggest that 
financial responsibility for litigation costs also affects whether the 
defendant will make an offer.92 Individual plaintiffs have fewer resources 
with which to pursue litigation, and are more likely to be risk averse. 93 
These studies suggest that in a two-way fee-shifting system, large, 
corporate or institutional defendants have an advantage over one-time 
petitioners.94 "If the plaintiff can be protected in some way from the risks 
of paying the other side's fee, the defendant will be more willing to make 
a settlement offer,,95, which resonates with the studies referenced above. 
When the plaintiff did not have to worry about paying the defendant's 
litigation costs, plaintiffs counsel was more likely to pursue the claim 
Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1955-66 
(2002) (discussing studies of attorney's fees in the United Kingdom during the 1980s). 
83 Id. at 1962. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1963-64. 
. 86 Id. at 1964. 
87 Id. 
88 Kritzer, supra note 82, at 1964. 
89 Id. at 1 964-65. 
90 Id. at 1965. 
91 Id. at 1957. 
92 Id. at 1955-56. 
93 See, e.g., Krent, supra note 11, at 2062. 
94 See id.; see also Kritzer, supra note 82, at 1957. 
95 Kritzer, supra note 82, at 1957. 
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aggressively. 96 Concomitantly, "[ w ]hen the plaintiff is fully at risk, the 
defendant can refuse to make an offer in the hope that the plaintiff will 
withdraw the claim rather than run the risk of a cost award.,,97 
The incentives of a two-way fee-shifting scheme may appear attractive 
and more in line with the judicial goals of neutrality and impartiality. 
Unfortunately, such a system can create disincentives that undermine the 
goals of the private attorney general doctrine: 
Legal costs influence all aspects of the litigation process, from the 
decision to file suit to the choice between settlement and trial to 
the question whether to take precautions against a dispute in the 
first place ... The combination of all these external effects are too 
complicated to be remedied by a simple rule of "loser pays." 
Instead, indemnity of legal fees remedies some externalities while 
failing to address and even exacerbating others.98 
Fee-shifting is not an administrative remedy designed to create a strictly 
neutral playing field. It is designed to level the inequities of the world 
outside the courtroom and to ensure that both parties to a dispute enter the 
neutral judicial forum on equal footing, despite the power imbalances that 
prevail outside the courtroom. These goals can only be fulfilled by the 
creation of a carefully crafted one-way fee-shifting mechanism. 
The Supreme Court understood this to be Congress's intent in enacting 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and articulated that understanding III 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. :99 
When a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II], he cannot 
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for 
himself alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating 
a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If 
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own 
attorney's fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to 
advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of 
the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for 
counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately 
advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, 
to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek 
judicial relief under Title 11. 100 
96 See id. at 1956. 
97 Id. at 1957 (quoting Avery Weiner Katz, Indemnity afLegal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECON. 64-65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Gees eds., 2000)). 
98 Id. at 1948. 
99 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
100 Id. at 402. 
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In providing for attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff, a legislature 
does not confer a legal advantage. The plaintiff must still prove her case 
in accordance with the standard set forth by the substantive law. Rather, 
a one-way fee-shifting provision merely shifts the incentive structure to 
permit individual plaintiffs to bring actions, thereby providing the 
opportunity to present their case: "the goal of fee-shifting statutes in 
general is to ensure that individuals, when injured by violations, or 
threatened violations, of certain laws, have access to legal counsel by a 
'statutory assurance that [his or her counsel] will be paid a reasonable 
fee[.]""o, If the legislature truly wanted to confer an advantage, it could 
do so by altering the liability standard or lowering the standard of proof. 
A fee-shifting provision is merely an affirmation that the legislature 
intends its substantive law to be meaningful and enforceable. 
One way fee-shifting still contains the inherent risk that plaintiffs may 
be encouraged to pursue a weak case too far, unnecessarily increasing 
costs for an innocent defendant. This can be addressed by including a 
"bad faith exception" in the one-way fee-shifting provision. Fees may be 
awarded to a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff brings an action 
in bad faith. 102 An alternative would be an exception for "frivolous" 
actions. Section 1988 provides an exception where the action brought by 
the plaintiff is frivolous, which is less onerous for defendants, but still 
protects plaintiffs with non-frivolous claims. 103 A "frivolous" standard 
may be interpreted more generously by courts than a "bad faith" 
exception and may strike a better balance. 104 
Fee-shifting provisions must carefully identify when the rule is 
triggered by articulating a clear definition of "prevailing party." To fully 
explicate what it means by "prevailing party," a well-crafted provision 
will address: 
lOl Friolo v. Frankel, 403 Md. 443, 457, 942 A.2d 1242, 1250 (2008) (citing Friolo v. 
Frankel, 373 Md. 501,526,819 A.2d 354, 369 (2003) [hereinafter "Friolo I'D. 
102 See Hylton, supra note 68, at 1107. A "two-way" bad faith exception is found in 
Maryland Rule 1-341, which provides for fee-shifting in civil matters if the court finds the 
conduct of either party "was in bad faith or without substantial justification." The fee can be 
extracted from either the offending party, the attorney advising the conduct, or both. The rule 
has been applied infrequently and is intended only for cases where there has been a clear and 
serious abuse of judicial process. See, e.g., Black v. Fox Hills N. Cmty. Ass'n Inc., 90 Md. 
App. 75, 83-84, 599 A.2d 1228,1232, cert. denied 326 Md. 177,604 A.2d444 (1992). 
103 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (West 2000). 
104 Compare Christiansburg Garment Co., v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (holding 
that plaintiff's subjective bad faith is not a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him); 
with Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) ("The plaintiff's action must be meritless in the 
sense that it is groundless or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose 
his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. "). 
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• Whether a formal judgment in the plaintiffs favor is required, or 
whether a consent decree, settlement or change in the defendant's 
behavior is sufficient to trigger the award of fees, the Equivalency 
Doctrine. los 
• If a change in the defendant's behavior is sufficient, whether the 
plaintiffs lawsuit must have been the "catalyst" or direct cause of 
the change, the Catalyst Theory. 106 
• Whether the relief must alter the "legal relationship" between the 
parties, the Legal Relationship Test. 107 
• The impact of partial resolutions and whether the outcome must 
have been resolved in the plaintiffs favor on the "central 
issue. ,,108 
• Whether the plaintiff must have benefited from the outcome. 109 
• The impact of settlement offers. I 10 
• Whether the parties can simultaneously negotiate settlement and 
attorney's fees, and whether the defendant can extract a waiver of 
fees in exchange for a favorable settlement. III Permitting 
settlement offers contingent upon a waiver of fees can have a 
105 Brand, supra note 5, at 318; see also Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1,3-4 (1988) (per 
curiam); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,755-56 (1987); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 
756 (1980) (per curiam); Hyundai Motor Am. v. Alley, 183 Md. App. 261, 272-73, 960 A.2d 
1257, 1263-64 (2008) (holding that no express judicial approval of the settlement was 
necessary where the procedure used was sufficiently indicative of prevailing party status). 
106 Karlan, supra note 61, at 206; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 
107 Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989). 
108 /d. at 787-88. 
109 Farrarv. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992). 
110 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I (1985) (holding that the prevailing plaintiff was not 
entitled to statutory fees for work performed after the date of a Rule 68 offer of judgment if 
the plaintiff failed to achieve better results than those offered, putting defendants in the 
driver's seat. Once the defendant makes an offer, plaintiffs counsel is at risk for losing his 
post-offer fee, which can create a conflict of interest for plaintiffs counsel who must counsel 
his client to accept the offer or risk losing any subsequent fee ifhe were to pursue his client's 
case more aggressively). 
III Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (allowing defendants to condition settlement of 
civil rights case on the waiver or reduction of plaintiff's attorney's fees); see also Paul 
Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL'y 1 (2008) 
(suggesting that Evans destroyed the enforcement mechanism of the Civil Rights Act by 
permitting the defendant to condition settlement on a waiver of fees, which can create a 
conflict of interest as well for plaintiffs counsel who may have to forgo a fee in order to 
secure a favorable settlement for her client. This can become problematic for defendants who 
may need to know their bottom line before making a settlement offer. Some suggested 
solutions have included: standardizing market rates so defendants know wha~ to expect; 
permitting defendants to discover information about probable attorney's fees; permitting 
defendants to make settlement offers contingent on a satisfactory resolution of the fees; or 
permitting defendants to make lump sum offers intended to cover both liability and fees); 
THIRD CIRCUIT, supra note 22, at 268-70. 
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deleterious effect on access to justice, and creates an untenable 
conflict for counsel.l 12 
• Whether the fee belongs properly to the litigant only 113, or 
whether the award can be made directly to the attorney.114 
• Whether fees can be awarded to legal services providers 
representing the prevailing party pro bono. 115 
• The impact ofmootness. 1I6 
• The impact of injunctive, declaratory or otherwise non-pecuniary 
relief. '17 
• The impact of nominal damages or de minimis relief.1l8 
In Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has not 
followed Buckhannon, suggesting the catalyst theory under which the 
plaintiffs lawsuit must have been the "catalyst" or direct cause of the 
change may still be grounds for establishing prevailing party status. 119 
Under current Maryland law, the court need not sanction a settlement by 
issuing a consent decree before a party can be determined to have 
prevailed. 120 In Hyundai Motor America v. A lley I 21 , the Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals found the plaintiff had prevailed even though the 
settlement was not finalized in a consent decree, although the court 
clearly acquiesced to the settlement, and the settlement was entered into 
the record. 122 Maryland courts may prefer an interpretation of these 
issues that promote settlement. Most recently, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found that fees were the property of the attorney, and thus 
112 It has been suggested that this issue might best be settled by the creation of an ethical 
rule to outlaw the type of quandary created by Jeff D. See 475 U.S. at 717; see also Ashley E. 
Compton, Shifting the Blame: The Dilemma of Fee-Shifting Statutes and Fee-Waiver 
Settlements, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 761, 761-62 (2009). 
113 Astrue v. Ratliff, 56 U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010) (explaining that fee awards under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act are payable to the litigant, not the attorney, and as such are 
subject to a government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt the litigant owes to the United 
States); Marek, 473 U.S. at 1. 
114 This issue has implications for whether the attorney can decline to accept a settlement 
offer contingent upon a waiver of fees, whether the fee can be diverted to pay a government 
debt, and also for whether fees can be awarded to a legal services provider who represented 
the prevailing party pro bono. Some legislatures and state courts, including the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, have made attorney's fees under fee-shifting statutes the property of the 
attorney. Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 290-92, 992 A.2d 446, 448-49 (2010). 
115 Maryland has said "yes." Id. at 290-92, 992 A.2d at 448-49. 
116 Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1,2 (1988). 
117 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 642-43. 
118 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109. 
119 Hyundai, 183 Md. App. at 269,960 A.2d at 1261-62. 
120 Id. at 270-72, 960 A.2d at 1262-63. 
121 Id. at 272-73, 960 A.2d at 1263-64. 
122 Id., at 272-73, 960 A.2d at 1264. 
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payable directly to a legal services provider, avoiding the diversion of 
funds to cover the litigant's outstanding state debt. 123 
V. CALCULATINGTHEFEEAWARD 
Courts have articulated several methods for calculating attorney's fees, 
when warranted. Until the early 1970's, fee calculations were largely left 
to the court's discretion. Courts generally used a standard of 
reasonableness to award fees. 124 Further, courts often used a reasonable 
"percentage of recovery" to determine the award even though this 
sometimes drew criticism when awards appeared disproportionate to the 
actual effort expended by counsel. 125 Awarding fees based on a 
percentage of recovery also fails to provide a market incentive for 
attorneys to accept clients with claims for injunctive or other non-
pecuniary relief, or where the anticipated damages are low. 
In the federal system, the Fifth Circuit established an alternative 
method for calculating fees, delineating in Johnson v. George Highway 
Express, Inc. twelve factors the court must consider. 126 These factors 
included, among others, considerations of time and labor, novelty and 
difficulty, the skill required, the preclusion of other employment by the 
attorney, and the attorney's customary fee. 127 According to some, the 
Johnson method failed to provide a meaningful analytical framework to 
guide courts in calculating the fee award, and awards based on the 
method may be more subject to reversal and remand. 128 
Today, federal courts generally use the "lodestar" approach in 
calculating fee awards. As noted by Judge Wilner in the Court's opinion 
in Friolo v. Frankel: 129 
The term "lodestar" has an Anglo-Saxon origin - "lad," a way or 
path, and "sterre," a star. It thus was a guiding star. See 
WEBSTER'S UNABRDIGED DICTIONARY at 1062. It later 
came to denote a "guiding ideal; a model for imitation." Id At 
some point, the term began to be applied to the method noted for 
determining reasonable attorney's fees. 130 
123 Henriquez, 413 Md. at 302, 992 A.2d at 455-56. 
124 THIRD CIRCUIT, supra note 22, at 242. 
125 Id. 
126 Johnson v. George Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
127 /d. at 717-19. 
128 THIRD CIRCUIT, supra note 22, at 245. 
129 See, e.g., Friolo 1,373 Md. at 501, 819 A.2d at 354. 
130 Id. at 504, 819 A.2d at 356, n.l. 
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In its most elemental form, the lodestar method requires the court to 
multiply reasonable hours actually worked by a reasonable market rate. 131 
The lodestar method, however, was always used as part of a more 
nuanced approach. Even when the lodestar method was used early on it 
was intended to be used in the context of other factors including the 
likelihood of success, the complexity and novelty of the issues, the 
quality of the attorney's work, and the recovery obtained. 132 After 
Hensley v. Eckerhart133 and Blum v. Stenson 134, the lodestar method 
became the predominant method for calculating fees in the federal 
system. 135 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied the lodestar method to 
the state's wage and hour laws and "indicated a general approval of the 
approach in conjunction with other fee-shifting statutes that provide for 
the possible award of attorney's fees, but lack criteria for how to calculate 
such fees.,,136 According to the court, Friolo I established the lodestar 
method as generally acceptable, but did not mandate its use, and did not 
preclude the use of other standards such as those provided in Johnson, 
Hensley, or Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. 137 
While lodestar is the presumptive method of calculation under the wage 
and hour laws in the state, its use will necessarily involve the "clear 
application and explanation of factors" and "case-specific 
adjustments.,,138 
These factors can be applied as multipliers to increase or decrease an 
award of fees. California, for example, permits the use of multipliers to 
account for a variety of factors, including: the quality of the 
representation; the results obtained; contingent risk; the preclusion of 
other employment; the undesirability of the case; a delay in payment; 
partial success; public benefit; and the identity and resources of parties or 
counsel. 139 As noted by the California Supreme Court: 
I3l THIRD CiRCUIT, supra note 22, at 243. 
I32 Friolo 1,373 Md. at 521,819 A.2d at 366 (citing Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. of Phila. v. 
Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitation Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (1973). 
133 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
134 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 897 (1984). 
\35 THIRD CiRCUIT, supra note 22, at 245-46. 
136 Manor Country Club v. Flaa, 387 Md. 297, 320, 874 A.2d 1020, 1034 (2005) (citing 
Friolo 1,373 Md. at 504-05, 819 A.2d at 356). 
137 Manor Country Club, 387 Md. at 320,874 A.2d at 1034. 
138 Friolo 1,373 Md. at 505,819 A.2d at 356. 
139 Gregory M. Bergman & John P. Dacey, Speaker Handouts: Attorney Fee-Shifting 
Litigation: Obtaining and Contesting Attorney Fees and Cost Awards, STRAFFORD, slide 34 
(Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://media.straffordpub.com!products/attomey-fee-shifting-
Iitigation-2009-12-16/speaker-handouts.pdf(last visited Oct. 16,2011). 
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[The purpose of a multiplier] is to fix a fee at the fair market 
value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, 
retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk 
or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of 
the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market 
rate for such services .... [The multiplier] for contingent risk 
[brings] the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important 
constitutional rights . . . into line with incentives they have to 
undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-
services basis. 140 
In a recent OpInIOn, the Supreme Court expressed concern about 
multipliers and enhancements to a fee. 141 In Perdue v. Kenny A., the 
Court held that the party seeking fees has the burden of identifying a 
factor that the lodestar method does not adequately address. 142 Without 
completely precluding multipliers and enhancements, the opinion 
certainly further decreases the likelihood that a multiplier will be applied 
in a federal case. 
While multipliers are less favored in the federal context l43, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland seems to suggest that multipliers might be 
permissible in the state, since the lodestar calculation is not the sole 
method of arriving at a reasonable fee. 144 In Friolo I, the court suggested 
this in saying that Rule 1.5, which requires an attorney's fee be 
reasonable, "is not inherently in conflict with fee-shifting statutes," 
because "[t]here are situations in which the two can be in harmony and 
where appropriate adjustments to a lodestar approach can produce a fee 
that would be reasonable under both the rule and the statute.,,145 The 
140 Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741-42 (2001). 
141 Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rei. Winn, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010). 
142 Id. at 1673. 
143 See Brand, supra note 5, at 336, 338-39. In Hensley, the court entertained the 
possibility of adjustments to the lodestar. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 432-33. In Blum, the Court 
reversed a 50% enhancement of the lodestar. Blum, 465 U.S. at 903-04. In Penn. v. Del. 
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, the Court permitted an enhancement for risk of loss. 
Penn. v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 728 (1987). Additionally 
a plurality of justices suggested there should be no enhancement in such instances absent a 
showing that the adjustment was necessary to attract competent counsel in that particular type 
of litigation. ld. at 732-33 (plurality opinion). Subsequently, in City of Burlington v. Dague, 
the Court, by invalidating an enhancement, called into question whether a multiplier for 
contingent risk would ever be endorsed. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557,565-66 
(1992). The Court noted that the lodestar is the presumptive method for federal courts, and 
that its calculations already presumably account for contingent risk. Id. The Court also 
emphasized that the use of enhancements would add uncertainty to the process and would 
increase the probability of fee litigation. ld. 
144 See, e.g., Friolo 1,373 Md. at 528-29, 819 A.2d at 370-71. 
145 Id. at 529,819 A.2d at 370. 
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court further stated that, when courts have used lodestar, such as in Friolo 
I, the "strict hours times rate methodology ... is ... simply the beginning 
point.,,146 
Finally, in determining how fees are computed, legislatures and courts 
may want to consider whether a losing defendant should have to pay a 
"contingency bonus" to plaintiff s counsel, "who assumed the risk of not 
being paid in case of defeat.,,147 Another consideration is whether 
counsel should be able to recover the difference between a fee award and 
a negotiated contingency rate. Some jurisdictions provide that the 
attorney can recover, from the prevailing plaintiff, additional fees 
established in a contingency fee agreement. 148 
Whatever method is chosen, proportionality has no place in it. The 
Supreme Court has stated, "[a] rule of proportionality would make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious civil rights 
claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the 
courts. This is totally inconsistent with Congress' [sic] purpose .... ,,149 
Therefore, proportionality is antithetical to the underlying purposes of 
fee-shifting. 
The use of the lodestar method, nuanced or not, is limited in 
Maryland. The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently clarified in 
Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., v. Hamilton,150 that the 
"lodestar method is an inappropriate mechanism for calculating fee 
awards in private, contractual debt-collection cases. Use of the lodestar 
in such cases is inappropriate because they lack the substantial public 
interest justification underlying its application in the context of true fee-
shifting statutes.,,151 The cases in Monmouth Meadows involved actions 
by homeowners' associations against residents delinquent in paying their 
annual assessments. 152 The residents in each case were contractually 
required to pay costs and fees incurred by the associations in collecting 
delinquent assessments. 153 These types of contractual provisions, while 
enforceable under Maryland law, do not share the public policy 
underlying most fee-shifting statutes. 154 The court was not persuaded that 
the enforcement of the contractual provisions, while authorized by law, 
provided any real public benefit that might warrant the greater fees 
146 ld. at 529,819 A.2d at 370-7l. 
147 Rowe, supra note 7, at 673. 
148 Rowe, supra note 7, at 674. 
149 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986). 
150 Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamilton, 416 Md. 325, 7 A.3d 1 
(2010). 
151 ld. at 336, 7 A.3d at 7. 
152 ld. at 329, 7 A.3d at 3. 
153 ld., 7 A.3d at 3. 
154 ld. at 335, 7 A.3d at 6-7. 
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available under a lodestar calculation. 155 The proper method for 
calculating fees in private debt collection actions is the reasonableness 
approach provided for in Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Lawyer's Rules of 
Professional Conduct. To those who might worry that use of the lodestar 
approach could create a slippery slope, likely to lead to enhanced fee 
awards in a broad range of case types, Monmouth Meadows suggests that 
there are limits.156 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE MARYLAND 
AND LOCAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
Claims against the Maryland state government are permitted subject to 
the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided for by the Maryland 
Tort Claims Act. 157 The act limits damages for injuries to a single 
claimant to $200,000. 158 Further, the act provides that attorney's fees are 
not to exceed 20% for a settlement or 25% of a judgment. 159 This means 
that a prevailing plaintiff may receive an award of no more than $40,000 
in a case that settles, and no more than $50,000 in a case which results in 
a judgment in his favor. 
The limits contained within the Maryland Tort Claims Act creates 
several problems for the potential litigant, especially in light of the 
holding in Lee v. Cline l60 , that immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims 
Act covers constitutional tortS. 161 Some claims, especially constitutional 
claims, are likely to result in low damages. Potential constitutional 
claimants would have to have deep pockets, and a willingness to part with 
their resources, in order to pursue a claim that would limit attorney fee 
awards to a percentage of recovery. The use of a percentage scheme to 
award fees eliminates all incentives for these types of claims for damages, 
and its effect has a disproportionately higher impact on low-income 
Marylanders. 
Even a claimant able to secure maximum damages under the act, may 
incur attorney's fees well in excess of $50,000. In such an instance, the 
claimant would either be made less than whole, or would have a 
significant incentive to settle the case when the $50,000 mark, or the 
likely percentage cap, were reached in attorney's fees. Plaintiffs counsel 
155 ld. at 335, 7 A.3d at 7. 
156 Monmouth Meadows, 416 Md. at 325 36, 7 A.3d at 1, 7. 
157 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §12-104 (West 1999). 
158 ld. 
159 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-109 (West 1985). 
160 Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 266, 863 A.2d 297, 310 (2004) ("[I]mmunity under the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act ... encompasses constitutional torts and intentional torts."). 
161 Karen J. Kruger, Governmental Immunity in Maryland: A Practitioner's Guide to 
Making and Defending Tort Claims, 36 U. BALT. L. REv. 37, 51 (2006). 
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may also have a conflict of interest that might cause them to urge 
settlement once it became clear that the fees incurred were approaching 
the cap, rather than pursuing their client's claim to the fullest extent 
possible. As aforementioned, limiting fees to a percentage of recovery 
undercuts the public policy foundations of the private attorney general 
doctrine. It creates a remedy gap between those with means and those 
without. 
In considering a general fee-shifting provision, the Maryland General 
Assembly should consider amending the Maryland Tort Claims Act to 
ensure that fee incentives permit aggrieved parties to have a meaningful 
opportunity to invoke the limited waiver of immunity provided by the act. 
Such an amendment might include revising the fee provisions of the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act to create an exception to the fee caps for 
constitutional torts and actions to enforce rights under Maryland laws, 
and to permit fees to be awarded in addition to, rather than subject to, the 
limited liability provided under the act in this subset of cases. 
Similar changes might be contemplated for the Local Government 
Tort Claims Act, which includes no fee provision. '62 The Act provides 
for a cap on damages in cases involving the liability of a local 
govemment. 163 In such claims, liability may not exceed $200,000 per 
individual claim, or $500,000 for claims that arise from the same 
occurrence.
164 The act does not provide for attorney's fees. It might be 
appropriate to invoke the general fee-shifting provision in that act, or 
amend the act itself to provide for reasonable fees to a prevailing plaintiff 
in actions involving constitutional claims or to enforce rights under 
Maryland law. 
VII. MARYLAND'S NUMEROUS FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS 
Maryland law includes numerous statutes with fee-shifting provisions 
including laws governing: 
• Wages and hours of employment; 165 
• Wage payment and collection; 166 
• Worker's compensation;167 
• Consumer protection; 168 
162 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303 (West 2007). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-427(d) (West 1991). 
166 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507(b)(I) (West 1991). 
167 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 4A-305(e) (West 1991). 
168 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2A-I08(4)(a) (West 1994). 
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• Email fraud· 169 , 
• Whistleblowers.
17o 
These separate provisions, of which there are over eighty, provide for 
fees using a variety of terms, expressions, and specifics. Some provide 
for "reasonable attorney's fees l71 " or "reasonable counsel fees l72," while 
others provide for "fees that are just and proper under all the 
circumstances. 173" Some provide for "expenses 174" or reasonable or 
necessary expenses "of prosecuting or defending the proceeding 175 ," 
while others add specific conditions under which fees may be awarded. 176 
In an action to recover unpaid wages, for example, the court may award a 
prevailing employee reasonable counsel fees and other costs, provided the 
action was not the result of a bona fide dispute. 177 
Most include no guidance on how the fee is to be calculated. The 
family law fee-shifting provisions provide some direction to the court in 
determining whether to exercise its discretion to award fees, but no 
guidance on precisely how the fee is to be calculated. 178 In actions 
concerning divorce, marital property, alimony and child support, before 
granting an award of attorney's fees, the court must consider the fmancial 
status or resources, the financial needs of both parties, and whether there 
was substantial justification for prosecuting or defending the 
proceeding. 179 On the other hand, attorney's fees in civil actions by 
merchants against shoplifters are to be calculated without regard to the 
ability of the respondent to pay.180 Fees are capped at $500 in actions 
brought to impose a lien for nonpayment of ground rent. 181 For the most 
169 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-4A-08 (West 1988). 
170 MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-303-305(6) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-311 (West 1996); see also PAUL MARK SANDLER & JAMES K. 
ARCHIBALD, PLEADING CAUSES OF ACTION IN MARYLAND 42 (4th ed. 2008) (providing a 
comprehensive list of statutory provisions for plaintiff's attorney's fees). 
171 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(b)(2) (West 2006); see also MD. CODE 
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-1035(e)(2) (West 2009). 
172 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507(b)(1) (West 2002). 
173 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-103(a) (West 2006) (regarding an action for 
child support). 
174 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-411 (West 2002) (stating in the Comments 
that "[t]here is no express provision for attorney's fees, but attorney's fees are not necessarily 
meant to be excluded."). 
175 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-107(b) (West 2006) (in divorce matters). 
176 See generally, PLEADING CAUSES OF ACTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 170. 
m MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.2(b) (West 2010). 
178 See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 7-107(c), 8-214(c), 11-11O(c), 12-103(b) (West 
2006). 
179 ld. 
180 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1305(b) (West 1991). 
181 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-402.3 G)(3)(ii) (West 2002). 
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part, what guidance there is on calculating the fee comes primarily from 
Maryland case law. 182 
The family law fee provisions highlight another feature of the panoply 
of statutory fee provisions. Most Maryland statutory fee provisions 
provide for one-way fee-shifting, authorizing the award of fees to a 
prevailing plaintiff. A few, including those governing fees in family law 
matters, and those involving time-shares183, mobile home park rent184, 
discriminatory housing practices185, ground rent186, violations of the 
Maryland condominium act 187, and those involving letters of credit188, 
provide for two-way fee-shifting. A few others, like the family law 
provisions, provide for one-way fee-shifting, with a bad faith exception, 
permitting an award of fees to the defendant in an action brought in bad 
faith or without substantial justification. 189 
In its Interim Report, the Maryland Access to Justice Commission 
urged the adoption of a generic fee-shifting provision, in part, to render 
more uniform the many different fee-shifting provisions embedded in the 
law. 190 Such a provision could codify Maryland case law on how those 
provisions should be interpreted, and how the fees should be calculated. 
A generic fee-shifting provision would improve the ability of Maryland 
judges to understand and apply those provisions uniformly, and would 
ensure that those provisions are effectively enforced to ensure access to 
representation in these matters that are so critical for many Marylanders. 
VIII. A PROPOSED FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION FOR MARYLAND 
Connecticut and Massachusetts have each adopted statutes that award 
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs for state constitutional claims 
brought under those state's civil rights acts. 191 California legislation, a 
182 See supra Section V. 
183 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § llA-125(c)(West 2002). 
184 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-1501(b)(4) (West 2002). 
185 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 20-1035(e)(2) (West 2007). 
186 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-402.3 (j)(3)(ii) (West 2002). 
187 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-1l3(c) (West 1985). 
188 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §5-III(e) (West 2002). 
189 See, e.g., Fox Hills, 90 Md. App. at 83-84, 599 A.2d at 1232. 
190 MARYLAND ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION, supra note I, at 26-27. 
191 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-25l(a), 46A-58 (West 1982) (allowing attorney's fees in a 
civil action to recover damages for injury to the person or property arising out of a deprivation 
of state or U.S. constitutional rights, privileges or immunities, on account of religion, national 
origin, alienage, color, race, sex, sexual orientation, blindness, or physical disability); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § llH, III (West 2010) (allowing an award of reasonable attorney's 
fees in an amount to be fixed by the court to an aggrieved person who prevails in an action 
under the commonwealth's civil rights statute); see also JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 10-03 (4th ed. 
2006) (reviewing state legislation authorizing attorney fee awards). 
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codification of the private attorney general doctrine, permits the award of 
attorney's fees to successful parties in any action that has resulted "in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest" provided 
a significant benefit, monetary or non-monetary, has been conferred on 
the general public or a large class of persons, the costs of private 
enforcement render an award appropriate, and such fees should not be 
paid out of the recovery, in the interests of justice. 192 The California 
version is broader, including claims that affect the public interest, not just 
constitutional claims, although it appears to favor class actions and 
actions in which the benefit to a larger group is clearly evident. 193 
The following proposed statutory language for Maryland is designed 
to capture the benefits of both types of provisions. On the one hand, it is 
designed to provide attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs asserting state 
constitutional claims or vindicating rights under Maryland remedial 
laws. It is also intended to bring under one umbrella the application of 
attorney's fees to other state laws that already authorize such an award. 
As such, it is designed to codify existing state law defining "prevailing 
plaintiff' and articulate the mechanism for calculating the fee award 
using the nuanced lodestar method envisioned by current Maryland case 
law. Finally, the proposed act would amend the fee provisions of the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act to create an exception to the fee caps for 
constitutional torts and actions to enforce rights under Maryland laws, 
and to permit fees to be awarded in addition to, rather than subject to, the 
limited liability provided under the act in this subset of cases. The latter 
change is likewise proposed for the Local Government Tort Claims Act. 
The proposed statute should either cross-reference all existing 
statutory fee-shifting provisions or, in the alternative, replace those 
provisions with a reference to the proposed provision offered below, 
noting that "[p ]revailing plaintiffs under this law are entitled to fees and 
expenses under this statute in accordance with [the new provision]." 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. Title 3, NEW Subtitle 4A or 18: 
§ 3-4A-01l3-1801. Attorney's fees in actions vindicating Maryland rights 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any civil action to enforce 
rights secured by the Constitution, Declaration of Rights, or laws of 
Maryland, the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's 
fees and expenses as part of the costs. 
192 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2010). 
193 See Friesen, supra note 191, at 10-03 ("[W]hile the language [of the California act] is 
not confined to suits in the nature of a class action, it is probable that the enforcement of a 
constitutional right must, in the particular case, have a broader impact than to rectify an 
individual injustice."). 
2011] Fee-Shifting to Promote the Public Interest 63 
§ 3-4A-02/3-1802. Prevailing party 
(a) For purposes of this subtitle or any other provision of a remedial state 
statute authorizing an award of attorney's fees, 
(1) a prevailing plaintiff includes one whose litigation achieved 
the desired result in whole or in substantial part, by bringing 
about a voluntary change in the conduct of the defendant; 
(2) a defendant may be awarded attorney's fees only upon a 
finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous. 
§ 3-4A-03/3-1803. Calculation of award 
(a) For purposes of this subtitle or any other provision of a remedial state 
statute authorizing an award of attorney's fees, the court shall determine 
the award by: 
(1) multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by 
reasonable hourly rates; 
(2) determining whether any adjustment should be made to that 
total after considering: 
(i) the time and labor required; 
(ii) novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(iii) the skill required to perform the legal service 
properly; 
(iv) preclusion of other employment by the attorney due 
to acceptance of the case; 
(v) the customary fee for similar work in the community; 
(vi) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(vii) time limitations imposed by the client or 
circumstances; 
(viii) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(ix) the experience, reputation, and ability of attorneys; 
(x) undesirability of the case; 
(xi) the nature and length of professional relationship with 
the client; and 
(xii) awards in similar cases; and 
(3) and awarding reasonable expenses. 
Amendments to the Maryland Tort Claims Act: 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. Title 12: 
§ 12-104. Waiver of State tort immunity 
(a)(2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a 
single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence, 
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EXPENSES MADE PURSUANT TO COURTS AND JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS § 3-4A-01/3-l80l . 
. . . § 12-109. Counsel fees 
EXCEPT PURSUANT TO COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
§ 3-4A-01l3-l80l, Counsel may not charge or receive fees that exceed: 
(1) 20% of a settlement made under this subtitle; or 
(2) 25% of a judgment made under this subtitle. 
Amendments to the Local Government Tort Claims Act: 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. Title 5, subtitle 3: 
§ 5-302. Representation by counsel; scope 
(b )(2)(i) An employee shall be fully liable for all damages awarded in an 
action in which it is found that the employee acted with actual malice, IN 
ADDITION TO ANY AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
EXPENSES MADE PURSUANT TO COURTS AND JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS § 3-4A-01/3-1801. 
§ 5-303. Local government liability; defenses available 
(a)(2) The limits on liability provided under paragraph (1) of this 
subsection do not include interest accrued on a judgment OR ANY 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES OR EXPENSES MADE 
PURSUANT TO COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 3-4A-
01/3-1801. 
